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Recognizing the need to end the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, Turkey signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer 
of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction1 in 2003. Turkey 
has been exerting every effort to fulfill its obligations stemming from 
the Convention. To that end, Turkey no longer produces or uses anti-
personnel mines and is involved in mine clearance, stockpile destruction, 
victim assistance and socioeconomic reintegration of mine victims. The 
latest demonstration of the determination with which Turkey fulfills its 
obligations is the Mine and Ordnance Disposal Facility that came into 
operation as of 8 November 2007.2
Convinced that mine action is both a humanitarian issue as well as 
one of disarmament, Turkey supports efforts aimed at ridding the world 
of the scourge of these indiscriminately used weapons through the global 
implementation of the Mine Ban Convention. Cognizant of the fact that 
almost 40 states that produce, stockpile or use landmines are still not 
parties to the Convention—meaning that millions of mines remain at 
their disposal—and situated in a geographic region where the level of 
adherence to the Convention remains especially low, Turkey uses every 
opportunity to address this shortcoming. At the same time, Turkey is 
well aware of the fact that efforts by states alone are not adequate.3
The Complementary Role of NGOs
The Mine Ban Convention is a legally binding international 
instrument that was hammered out by states with the support of 
inter-governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Conferring 
certain rights and obligations to States Parties, it gives them the right 
to seek and receive assistance in implementing the provisions of the 
Convention. In this context, the Convention stipulates that States 
Parties may seek assistance through NGOs, and that States Parties who 
have the capability may also provide such assistance to other States 
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Parties through NGOs. Indeed, States Parties have benefited from 
assistance sought and provided through NGOs that carry out activities 
in this field on some occasions. The Convention, however, does not 
authorize NGOs to act ex officio. In view of the relevant provisions of 
the Convention, the request and consent of the State Party concerned is 
a sine qua non element of the complementary activities of said NGOs. 
The Nairobi Plan of Action, which is a political document designed as 
a five-year roadmap, does not amend or modify this understanding 
inherent in the Convention.4
One of the ways in which States Parties have sought assistance 
through NGOs is by having their armed non-state actor(s) engage in 
mine action. Under international law this is, however, questionable 
because a State Party does not bear a responsibility for acts that are 
committed in areas where a de facto authority, such as an ANSA, may 
have actual control. Several States 
Parties have requested or allowed 
such engagements in order to 
fulfill obligations they do not 
believe they can otherwise ful-
fill, as Mine Ban Convention 
obligations extend to all areas 
under States Parties’ jurisdiction 
or effective control. Some States 
Parties request or allow ANSA 
engagement in order to remove anti-personnel landmines from the list 
of weapons available to ANSAs with which they are engaged in armed 
struggle. Others have sought assistance or engagement within the con-
text of efforts aimed at peace and reconciliation. In summary, States 
Parties that have acquiesced to NGO engagement of ANSAs may have 
benefited from this involvement for one reason or another.5
The Need for a Case-By-Case Approach
The engagement of ANSAs should be considered on a case-by-case 
basis, first and foremost due to definitional difficulties. While the legal 
and academic debates on the definition of ANSAs continue, one crucial 
aspect is clear. Many terrorist groups, which pose a threat to domes-
tic as well as international peace and security, fit the existing widely 
held definitions of ANSAs. As such, the activities of such groups may 
be punishable under the domestic criminal laws of the state(s) in ques-
tion, as well as international treaty law. Dealings that may amount to 
or be considered as direct or indirect support for such groups may be 
similarly punishable. One only needs to look 
at the United States, European Union and 
NATO lists of terrorist organizations, as well 
as the countering-terrorism laws and lists of 
proscribed organization of States Parties such 
as the United Kingdom, France, Germany, 
Australia and Canada. The only conceivable 
way in which ANSAs with terrorist back-
grounds may be engaged, is if they renounce 
the use of violence, turn their weapons in and 
hand their members who have perpetrated 
acts of violence over to justice. Even then, 
close scrutiny would be required.
Certain ANSAs may try to use humani-
tarian engagement as a strategy to legitimize 
their political/ideological aims or even to 
acquire a legal status. Subject to the specific 
and applicable provisions of international 
humanitarian law, which by no means may 
establish a permanent and de jure status, orga-
nizations that carry out humanitarian work 
have the obligation to make sure that they are 
not abused. Otherwise, they may undermine 
the sovereign rights and obligations of states 
(such as protecting citizens from terrorist 
attacks) thus increasing tensions and risking 
the security environment that they aim to 
enhance. Therefore, absolute compliance by 
the humanitarian organizations to the neu-
trality and impartiality principles are of vital 
importance. Moreover, in such a situation, 
particularly the common public may perceive 
them as a party to the conflict.
In addition to these general points that 
would apply to all types of humanitarian 
NGO engagement with armed non-state 
actors, there are reasons specific to the Mine 
Ban Convention why engagement has to 
be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. First, 
ANSAs that engage in terrorist activities 
should not be permitted to have access to any 
types of weapons, be they nuclear, biological, 
chemical, radiological or conventional. It 
must not be forgotten that terrorism is an 
international crime and if NGOs wish to carry 
out humanitarian work in the field of disar-
mament, they ought to be staunch supporters 
of efforts to prevent not just victim-activated 
anti-personnel mines but all types of weapons 
from falling into the hands of terrorists.
Second, engaging ANSAs on a relatively 
high profile area of disarmament such as a 
total ban on AP landmines may actually be 
an incentive for ANSAs to use such weapons. 
The reasoning behind this is fairly straight-
forward. ANSAs that previously did not use 
anti-personnel landmines or had not been 
using them for some time may engage in 
attacks with these types of weapons to attract 
international attention and possible engage-
ment. Following engagement and exposure, 
they may renounce the use of AP landmines, 
which they had no intention to use in the first 
place. Meanwhile, AP mines will have been 
laid, indiscriminate harm will have been 
caused and landmine contamination, possibly 
for decades, will have occurred.
A Policy Prescription
For the reasons outlined above, the deli-
cate issue of engaging armed non-state actors 
within the context of the Mine Ban Convention 
has to be done with utmost caution, prudence 
and common sense. Theoretically speaking, 
there may be no way to objectively measure 
and implement such attributions. A common 
benchmark, therefore, has to be found for 
engaging ANSAs and the best possible way to 
ensure this is informing the State Party con-
cerned and obtaining its consent.
Following on and as described in the 
beginning of this paper, there are indeed States 
Parties to the Convention that have requested 
and benefited from having their ANSA 
engaged. As there are actors in the Mine Ban 
community that provide such engagement 
services, and as there are third parties that 
may be willing to fund these types of activi-
ties, in the event that a State Party makes the 
sovereign choice of requesting or allowing the 
engagement of “its” ANSA, it falls on no other 
actor to question such an engagement that is 
based on state sovereignty and consent.
In fact, the Nairobi Plan of Action, which 
sets the operational terms of such engage-
ments, also acknowledges the need for con-
sent. Action 46 of the Plan stipulates, “States 
Parties in a position to do so will ... continue to 
support, as appropriate, mine action to assist 
affected populations in areas under the con-
trol of ANSAs.”6 It is clear that States Parties 
are assigned the task of mine action, insofar 
as such action is deemed appropriate. In other 
words, Action 46 is contingent upon the posi-
tion of the State Party. Moreover, it is also 
evident from this action, quoted by many to 
justify unrestrained engagement with ANSAs, 
that the engagement foreseen therein is lim-
ited to “assisting affected populations in areas 
under the control of ANSAs.” Hence Action 46 
can only be used as a basis for engagement of 
“…the delicate issue of engaging armed non-
state actors within the context of the Mine Ban 
Convention has to be done with utmost caution, 
prudence and common sense.”
States Parties if a certain part of their terri-
tory is under the control of ANSAs. It must be 
noted that all of these considerations are irre-
spective of where such engagements physically 
take place.
Recognizing the need for prior informa-
tion and consent, the Zagreb and Geneva 
Progress Reports read, “…as rights and obli-
gations enshrined in the Convention and com-
mitments in the Nairobi Action Plan apply to 
States Parties, some States Parties are of the 
view that when engagement with armed non-
state actors is contemplated, States Parties 
concerned should be informed and their con-
sent would be necessary in order for such an 
engagement to take place.”7 Turkey is one of 
the States Parties that shares this view.
On the other hand, when such a prior 
consent of the territorial State Party is not 
required, mine clearance and other relevant 
humanitarian work by third parties may, as 
also described above, undermine the sover-
eign rights and obligations of the state. Such 
NGO activities may risk serving the illegiti-
mate objectives of the armed non-state actor 
in question by increasing tension and thus 
adversely affecting not just the local security 
environment, but also endangering interna-
tional efforts aimed at combating terrorism.
Not applying this rule of thumb also risks 
sending the wrong kind of signals to states that 
are outside the Convention but are seriously 
contemplating accession. After all, how many 
states would want to be part of a community 
that undermines their sovereign rights, espe-
cially on a matter of national security? Just as 
important is the question of how many States 
Parties can remain in a community in which 
its sovereign rights are undermined. In short, 
State Party consent within the context of ANSA 
engagement is vital for the globalization of and 
adherence to the Mine Ban Convention.
Conclusion
It is clear that NGOs and third parties can-
not achieve the common goal of creating a 
mine-free world if they build their activities on 
ignoring or challenging sovereign rights of the 
State Party concerned. They must work in coop-
eration with the territorial state in question.
“After all, how many states would want to 
be part of a community that undermines 
their sovereign rights, especially on a 
matter of national security?”
by Dr. Sadi Cayci [ Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi ] 
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NGOs and international institutions may also devise ways and means through which they 
can fulfill humanitarian goals. They could find a way to advance such goals and help states cre-
ate a more secure environment at the same time. They could assure states regarding the pure 
humanitarian purpose of their respective institutions. Furthermore, they could prevent third 
party abuse of the humanitarian cause for the purpose of intervening or undermining the sover-
eign rights of the state. In short, establishing an environment of mutual trust between actors is 
essential to overcoming legal and political impediments. Exploring the criteria and conditions 
for engaging armed non-state actors to secure their respect for international humanitarian law 
and human rights standards may, indeed, yield some positive results. However, this exercise can-
not be done in a vacuum, turning a blind eye to other relevant factors and developments that 
shape and at times threaten international security. Otherwise, they will lead to more harm than 
good in the long run. 
See Endnotes, page 112
From 2000 to 2006, 10 Senior Managers and 40 Middle Managers Training Courses were conducted for national staff of mine-action programmes from 42 countries. More than 800 managers 
(including nearly 200 senior managers and over 600 middle managers) 
completed these courses initiated by the United Nations Development 
Programme. The courses were designed on the basis of a 1999 UNDP-
United Nations Mine Action Service’s Training Needs Assessment1 
conducted in response to a 1997 United Nations Department of 
Humanitarian Affairs study2 on the “Development of Indigenous Mine 
Action Capacity,” which concluded that the absence of management 
skills was a major obstacle to national ownership of mine-action pro-
grammes. At the end of 2006, the UNDP’s Bureau of Crisis Prevention 
and Recovery sought to assess the impact of this training on national 
UNDP Management Training Programme 
for National Mine-Action Managers
by Charles Downs [ Downs Consulting ]
The current training programmes for National Mine Action Managers are examined to determine the advantages 
of the courses as well as areas in which the programmes can be improved.  
Senior Managers Course participants enjoyed a metal-detector demonstration at Ft. Belvoir while studying at James Madison University.
ALL PHOTOS COURTESY OF THE MAIC 
mine-action programmes in order to provide a solid basis for further 
decisions regarding future management training.
In December 2006, the Geneva International Centre for Humani-
tarian Demining agreed to conduct a review of the courses and their 
impact, with the final report to be completed by the end of January 2007. 
Within this short timeframe, GICHD collected and analysed exten-
sive information about the course providers, course participants, their 
supervisors and others. It was, however, not possible to conduct coun-
try visits to assess the impact on the effectiveness of the national pro-
gramme from the perspective of key external stakeholders.3
The GICHD study team (led by the author)4 established a work plan 
to collect and analyse relevant information, including interviews with 
the UNDP and background documents; site visits to the two prime 
Swiss Exploring Gender in Mine Action
The initiative to understand the topic of gender in mine action 
has recently generated significant discussion throughout the 
global community. Specialists exploring this area are shedding 
new light on the dissimilar practices, behaviors and communi-
cations of males and females in order to improve international 
mine-action activities in the field and office. As part of the 
Gender and Mine Action Programme, the Swiss Campaign to Ban 
Landmines is currently researching and producing a gender-
integrated manual that synthesizes practical recommendations 
with actual case studies. 
Not only will the manual answer the question of why mine-action practitioners should be more 
cognizant of gender issues, it will also answer the question of how gender-attentive procedures 
may be implemented. For the latter purpose, the SCBL hopes to integrate legal theory and acces-
sible resources to make progress easily attainable. Practicality is imperative, since the manual 
is intended for a broad audience of mine-action organizations, governments, donors, civil-society 
actors, gender-focused organizations and community-based organizations.
The first section of the manual will elaborate on gender as it relates to each of the five pillars 
of mine action. This section will include an overview of the current state of affairs, real-world 
illustrations, best practices and unsuccessful enterprises. The manual will highlight recom-
mendations to promote realistic application of the information presented. The second section of 
the manual will feature five in-depth case studies of Lebanon, Mozambique, Sudan, Sri Lanka and 
Colombia. Reports for each country will include details about the current mine problem for that 
country, insight about the regional gender situation, best practices and successful gender initia-
tives. Recommended topics for further research and piloting will also be incorporated.
The SCBL would appreciate participation in providing diverse personal perspectives for the manual. 
Though the formal submission deadline of 15 February 2008 has passed, e-mail Marie Nilsson at 
m.nilsson@scbl-gender for more information or to send comments. SCBL is interested in receiving a 
broad range of pertinent content: project examples, initiatives, tips, ideas, measures of achieve-
ment, successful integration stories, unsuccessful initiatives, problems and relevant photos. 
Additionally, the Journal of Mine Action’s upcoming Issue 12.2 will focus upon gender in mine ac-
tion, and related articles are now being accepted. Please see the “Call for Papers” on the back 
cover of this magazine for more information.
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